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I. INTRODUCTION
The inhabitants of the earth spend more money on illegal
drugs than they spend on food. More than they spend on hous-
ing, clothing, education, medical care, or any other product or
service. The international narcotics industry is the largest
growth industry in the world. Its annual revenues exceed half a
trillion dollars - three times the value of all United States cur-
rency in circulation, more than the gross national products of all
but a half dozen of the major industrialized nations. To imagine
the immensity of such wealth, consider this: A million dollars in
gold would weigh as much as a large man. A half-trillion dollars
would weigh more than the entire population of Washington,
D.C.
Narcotics industry profits, secretly stockpiled in countries
competing for the business, draw interest exceeding $3 million
per hour. To what use will this money eventually be put? What
will be its ultimate effect?'
These were the questions confronting the Ninety-first Con-
gress of the United States when it began to address the problem of
money laundering, that is, the process of concealing the existence
or source of illegal income and then using it as if it were legiti-
mate.2 This Article traces the United States Government's efforts
to combat money laundering from its meager beginnings twenty
years ago, to its present day status as a potent weapon in the na-
1. J. MILLS, THE UNDERGROUND EMPIRE 3 (1986).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter PCOC REPORT]. The term "money
laundering" is derived from the criminal jargon in which "dirty" or "black" money is
washed so that it appears to be clean. Id.
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tion's arsenal in the war on drugs.8
The first section of this Article discusses the enactment of the
Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, commonly re-
ferred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), which required the re-
porting of certain cash transactions to the Government. This Arti-
cle will analyze the congressional intent underlying the BSA, the
implementing regulations, as well as the administrative and legal
obstacles which hampered initial enforcement efforts. Wherever
possible, this Article will briefly discuss some of the early, albeit
relatively minor, successes under the Act during the latter half of
the 1970s.
The next section of this Article traces the use of the BSA dur-
ing the first half of the 1980s, when it began to emerge as a major
weapon in the war on drugs. This section ends with a discussion of
the 1984 amendments to the BSA which closed several loopholes in
its enforcement, but still left unaddressed the emerging practice of
structuring, that is, splitting currency transactions to avoid the
BSA's reporting requirements.
The third section of this Article covers the latter half of the
1980s, particularly, the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
(MLCA).4 This section analyzes the successful prosecutions of ma-
jor money laundering syndicates which laundered the narcotics
proceeds of such notables as the Medellin cartel and Manuel
Noriega. This section concludes with a discussion of the 1988
amendments to both the BSA and the MLCA.
The final section of this Article discusses the problems imped-
ing the Government's current enforcement efforts. It offers recom-
mendations to address these problems and achieve maximum effec-
tiveness from the existing legislation.
3. 135 CONG. REc. H5488-503 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1989) (statement of Sen. Annunzio).
For a critical view of the Government's attack on money laundering, see Villa, A Critical
View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U.L.
REV. 489 (1988).
4. Title I, Subtitle H, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-
22 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1989), scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
(1984 & Supp. V 1989), and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5316, 5317(b) & (c), 5318(a)(3), (a)(4) & (f),
5322(b) & 5324 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
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II. ENACTMENT OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT
A. Legislative Background
In 1970, Congress reacted to traditional organized crime's fre-
quent use of secret bank accounts in foreign countries by enacting
the first statute aimed specifically at combatting money launder-
ing.' Although primarily concerned with narcotics trafficking fi-
nancing, Congress also tried to address a myriad of other organized
and white collar criminal practices.6 As an example of the illegal
uses of secret accounts, Congress specifically pointed to the prac-
tice of laundering income through the use of fictitious loans.7 Or-
ganized crime figures would move illegal profits into secret bank
accounts and would then "borrow" the money back through ficti-
tious loans, thereby laundering it and also benefitting from false
income tax deductions claimed as "interest" on the "loan." 8
Additionally, most of the foreign jurisdictions used in these
money laundering schemes had corporate secrecy laws which ap-
plied the same standards of confidentiality to business information
as applied to banking information." As a result, agents pursuing
leads in such countries would run into a virtual iron curtain of for-
eign secrecy laws.'0
Congress recognized that in particular foreign jurisdictions,
neither law enforcement authorities nor banking institutions would
cooperate with American authorities.11 Additionally, the applica-
tion of American law in foreign countries was impractical. 2 Conse-
quently, Congress authorized the imposition of recordkeeping and
reporting requirements on corporations and individuals in the
5. Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
6. H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 16,955-56 (1970) [hereinafter H.R.
15073]. Congress was concerned with the following practices: tax evasion; overstatement of
costs on government contracts; violations of stock purchase margin requirements, the ma-
nipulation of stock prices; insider trading; concealment of skimmed money from gambling
casinos; and, most importantly, the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime
figures. Id.
7. Id. at 16,956.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 16,952.
10. Id. at 16,963.
11. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Cone CONG. & AD-




United States who dealt with foreign financial agencies. ' s Under
the BSA, Congress intended to force those subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion to disclose the source of money deposited in secret foreign
bank accounts. This was done in order to impede organized crime's
use of tainted money to control legitimate businesses.14 Congress
hoped to remove the anonymity which attached to cash transac-
tions, and to create an audit trail for investigators to follow.
B. Regulations Under the Bank Secrecy Act
In 1972, the Secretary of the Treasury implemented the regu-
lations authorized under Title II of the BSA' and imposed the
following requirements relative to financial transactions:"
1) Banks must file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR)17
with the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relative to
each cash transaction of $10,000 or more, except when the transac-
tion involves another financial institution or a customer with an
account where such an amount was commensurate with the cus-
tomary conduct of the business.18
2) Parties, other than financial institutions and common carri-
ers, carrying or receiving currency or other monetary instruments
13. Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1989), and 31 U.S.C. §§
5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
14. H.R. 15073, supra note 6, at 16,955.
15. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114
(1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989))
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to:
1. prescribe regulations for the reporting of transactions involving currency or any other
monetary instruments by the participating individuals, and financial institutions (31 U.S.C.
§§ 5312-5313 (1983 & Stpp. VI 1989));
2. require reports on all transactions with foreign financial agencies (31 U.S.C. § 5314
(1983));
3. require reports on foreign currency transactions (31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1983)); and
4. require reports on the export and import of monetary instruments (31 U.S.C. § 5316
(1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
Title I of the Act, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1989))
required the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations requiring financial institu-
tions to maintain certain records which might be useful in investigations. See H.R. REP. No.
975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4394, 4395. For
an analysis of the recordkeeping requirements, see Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting-
House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy Act, 37 CArH. UL. REv. 465 (1988).
16. Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31
C.F.R. § 103 (1972).
17. Internal Revenue Service Form 4789.
18. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1972).
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in excess of $5,0009 into or out of the United States on any one
occasion, or causing the transportation thereof, must disclose the
transportation by filing a Currency and Monetary Instruments Re-
port (CMIR)20  with the United States Customs Service
(Customs). 2 1
3) Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
having an interest in a foreign financial account must file a Foreign
Bank Account Report (FBAR) 2 with the Treasury Department
disclosing the interest in that account.2"
It is noteworthy that under the first provision, financial insti-
tutions conducting reportable domestic transactions were required
by the government to identify the parties2 4 involved in the transac-
tions and file the required CTRs.2" The Government had chosen to
rely upon and burden financial institutions for the required




It is important to note that the BSA did not prohibit money
laundering, but merely imposed reporting and recordkeeping re-
quirements with severe penalties for non-compliance.2"
C. Early Enforcement Efforts
Although this Article's opening quotation uses gold to empha-
size the enormity of wealth accruing to narcotics traffickers, drug
19. The $5,000 reporting threshold was raised to $10,000 under the Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(c)(2), 98 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
5316 (1983 & Supp. IV 1989)). See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
20. Customs Form 4790.
21. 37 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1972) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1972)). Monetary instru-
ments are defined as including all negotiable instruments, incomplete instruments signed
but with the payee's name omitted, and securities or stock in bearer or similar form so that
title passes upon delivery. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(k) (1972). In this paper, for the purposes of
clarity and brevity, the terms currency or cash will be used but are intended to include all
such monetary instruments.
22. Treasury Form TDF 90-22.1.
23. 37 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1972) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1972)).
24. Id. at 6913-15.
25. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1972).
26. For commentaries on the privacy implications of these regulations, 'see Plambeck,
Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking
Secrecy, 22 INrr'L LAW. 69 (1988); Comment, Bank Secrecy Act: Privacy, Comity, and the
Politics of Contraband, 11 N.C.J. INrT'L L. & COM. RaG. 667 (1986); and Note, The Bank
Secrecy Act - Conflict Between Government Access to Bank Records and the Right of Pri-
vacy, 37 ALB. L. Rav. 566 (1973).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 5321-5322 (1972).
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traffickers do not deal in gold. The estimated $100 billion dollars
in narcotics trafficking proceeds raised in the United States each
year originates with drug users on the streets paying for their illicit
goods with $5, $10 and $20 bills.28 The currency's sheer volume
presents major problems for the drug traffickers, as well as unique
opportunities for law enforcement agencies.29
Narcotics trafficking ringleaders, while wanting the proceeds
of illegal narcotics transactions, do not want to be caught near
their contraband. Moreover, stacks of currency are worthless un-
less they can be used. Consequently, traffickers have to launder the
money in order to disguise its origin and make it appear legitimate.
Traffickers that launder large amounts of currency, or its
equivalent, by moving it through a country with bank secrecy laws
are confronted with the problem of finding a means to transport it
without being detected by law enforcement agencies, or having the
currency stolen by enterprising free-lancers.30
Federal law enforcement agencies, specifically Customs" and
the IRS"2 , which were charged with enforcing the BSA, intended to
capitalize on the problems confronting narcotics traffickers. Unfor-
tunately, due to a variety of administrative and legal problems, the
Treasury Department and these agencies were slow in implement-
ing and enforcing the BSA's requirements.33
1. Administrative Problems
Among the administrative problems that impeded the imple-
mentation of the BSA were the following: A non-aggressive govern-
mental posture regarding compliance by financial institutions;3" a
28. 135 CONG. REC. H5488-89 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1989) (statement of Sen. Annunzio).
29. A million dollars, composed of an equal mix of these denominations would consist
of 85,715 individual bills weighing 189 pounds. According to the Federal Reserve, there are
490 individual notes to a pound. One hundred billion dollars would weigh approximately
nine tons. BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PuB. No. 15,
PRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT SE uRrrIs 5 (1985). These bills, if new, unwrinkled, and put in
a single stack, would reach more than 600 miles high. Id.
30. Interview with Glendell W. Roberts, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (Currency
Investigations), United States Customs Service, Miami, Florida, in Miami, Florida (Nov. 16,
1989) [hereinafter Roberts Interview].
31. 31 C.F.R. § 103.46 (1972), supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
32. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24, 26 (1987), supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
33. THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, BANK
SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING
NEED FoR AMENDMENT i-ill (1981) [hereinafter CG REPORT).
34. Among the agencies responsible were the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
1990]
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failure to clarify the provision exempting ordinary business trans-
actions from domestic reporting requirements; 5 a failure to require
financial institutions to maintain lists of the exempted busi-
nesses;-" a failure to resolve questions concerning split deposits; 7 a
lack of uniformity in the assessment of penalties; 8 a lack of dis-
semination of BSA reports;" a lack of coordination among law en-
forcement agencies having use for the data collected; 40 and, a lack
of committed resources.4 1 These shortcomings were brought to the
attention of the Treasury Department as early as 1975, but were
not corrected until 1980.42 A possible indication of the Treasury
Department's attitude toward enforcement was the fact that only
one person at the Department was responsible for implementation
and oversight of the BSA during that period. s
2. IRS Problems
The legal problems encountered provided even greater en-
forcement obstacles than the administrative problems. The IRS
faced its first legal hurdle with the constitutional challenges
brought forward in California Bankers Association v. Shultz." In
that case, several named individual bank customers, the Security
National Bank, the California Banker's Association, and the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union sought a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other
federal agencies from enforcing the provisions of the BSA. The
plaintiffs alleged that, if enforced, these provisions would infringe
upon the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution. 5
The district court issued the temporary restraining order en-
joining the enforcement of the CMIR and CTR reporting provi-
the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National
Credit Union Administration. Id. at 15-21.
35. Id. at 23-24.
36. Id. at 24-25.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id. at 26-28.
39. Id. at 7-8, 28-29.
40. Id. at 32-35.
41. Id. at 22-23.
42. Id. at 25-26.
43. Id. at 22.
44. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
45. Id. at 41.
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sions and requested the convening of a three judge court to con-
sider the myriad of constitutional issues raised."". The three judge
court upheld the CMIR regulations, but held that the CTR regula-
tions were facially violative of the fourth amendment on the basis
that they permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to require re-
ports of virtually all domestic financial transactions, regardless of
their personal nature.47 Consequently, Customs was free to begin
enforcement of the CMIR requirements, but the IRS was enjoined
from implementing the CTR requirements. 8
Both the plaintiffs and the Government appealed the decision
to the United States Supreme Court which considered the first,
fourth, and fifth amendment claims.4" The first amendment chal-
lenge was based on allegations that the information available to
the Government under the regulations could possibly be used to
identify members of, and contributors to, various organizations in
violation of the guarantee of freedom of association.50 The fourth
amendment challenge was based on the assertion that the Govern-
ment's access to the information contained in the reports consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and seizure.51 The fifth amendment
challenge was based on a contention that the reporting require-
ment constituted compelled self-incrimination,52 and that the regu-
lations were unduly burdensome, had no rational relationship to
the Government's objective and, as such, were violative of due
process.53
The United States Supreme Court upheld the law on the is-
sues raised, but two concurring Justices noted that if the Secretary
of the Treasury had elected to impose the CTR reporting require-
ment on the depositors rather than on the financial institutions,
the fifth amendment self-incrimination challenge might have posed
a more significant constitutional question. 4 Even though the Gov-
ernment won the suit, the case was not decided until April 4,
1974. 5 Consequently, the IRS could not implement the CTR re-
46. Id.
47. Id. at 42.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 42-44.
50. Id. at 42-43.
51. Id. at 43-44.
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id. at 42-43.
54. Id. at 78-79 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
55. Id. at 21.
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porting requirements until two years after the regulations were en-
acted, and four years after the enabling legislation had been
passed. 56
Once the IRS began to enforce the BSA, the administrative
problems cited above became critical.57 The questions left unan-
swered by the BSA and its implementing regulations quickly came
to the forefront and further frustrated enforcement efforts. 8 In ad-
dition, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act"
(RFPA) in 1978, which limited the government's access to financial
institutions' customer bank records. As a result, banks were often
required to notify customers of the government's interest in their
accounts and give them the opportunity to challenge the govern-
ment's request.8 0
Although the RFPA specifically provided that financial insti-
tutions were not precluded from advising government authorities
of possible violations of law,"' its major purpose was to protect the
confidentiality of an individual's financial records from the federal
government." Therefore, since there was no provision requiring fi-
nancial institutions to disclose information, and numerous prohibi-
tions against it, many banks took a conservative approach and pro-
tected the confidentiality of such information. 3
3. Customs Problems
While the IRS was being prevented from collecting CTRs,
Customs was having its own legal problems enforcing the CMIR
56. Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat, 1114
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
58. CG REPORT, supra note 33, at 23-26. Two questions were left unanswered: Which
businesses could the financial institutions exempt from the reporting requirements? What
happened if a depositor Affirmatively acted to avoid the reporting requirements by splitting
deposits? Id.
59. Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1980 & Supp. IX 1989)). See infra notes 253-55 and
accompanying text.
60. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3408.
61. Id. § 3402.
62. Id. § 3403.
63. The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearings
on S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 85 (1986) (testimony of Robert Hodges, General Counsel and Executive Vice Presi-
dent, South Carolina Banker's Ass'n, representing the American Banker's Ass'n).
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requirements. The first enforcement hurdle it faced was the stat-
ute's "willfulness" requirement." U.S. courts had consistently held
that Customs was required to establish, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that persons who entered or left the country without declar-
ing currency in excess of $5,000 had both knowledge of the report-
ing requirement and the specific intent to commit the crime."' At
least one court had held that absent such a showing, conviction
was inappropriate even though a traveller had deliberately lied to
Customs and denied transporting more than $5,000.66 Customs ad-
dressed this problem by posting signs at airports,"7 amending the
U.S. Customs Declaration to include a notice of the reporting re-
quirement,6 and having Customs Inspectors and carrier personnel
specifically advise travellers of their responsibility to report. s
Customs faced another major obstacle relative to its search au-
thority in the enforcement of the BSA. Customs officers have long
been empowered to search persons entering the country for mer-
chandise or contraband, 0 and to search outgoing persons and
cargo for violations of the export control laws.71 However, Con-
gress, in enacting the original BSA, specifically limited Customs
authority to conduct searches for currency. 72 Under the statute,
Customs officers were empowered to search for currency only after
obtaining a search warrant based upon a showing of probable
cause. Courts relied on the wording of the BSA73 and would not
64. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1982 & Supp. VI 1989)(requiring that a person willfully violate
this subchapter or a regulation prescribed thereunder before criminal penalties apply).
65. United States v. Chen, 605 F.2d 433 (11th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dichne, 612
F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 928; United States v. Granada, 565 F.2d 922
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1976).
66. Granada, 565 F.2d 922.
67. CG REPORT, supra note 33, at 21.
68. Customs Form 6059-B is distributed to international passengers to enable the pas-
senger to declare the amount of currency being brought into or out of the United States.
69. United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 161 (11th Cir. 1982).
70. Act of July 18, 1866, § 3, 14 Stat. 178 (codified as amended as 19 U.S.C. § 482, (1978
& Supp. XI 1989); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1496, 1581, & 1582 (1980 & Supp. IX 1989)). See also
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
71. Most courts have held that the authority to conduct export searches is found in 22
U.S.C. § 401 (1990). Although that section only authorizes seizures, the courts have implied
the power to conduct reasonable searches as a necessary adjunct to the power to seize.
Samora v. United States, 406 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp.
59 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). The implied search authority reasoning was not appropriate for cur-
rency searches because the statute explicitly provides for the use of a search warrant based
upon probable cause. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1983).
72. S. REP. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sass. 7 (1970).
73. 31 U.S.C. § 5317 states that a search warrant based upon probable cause may be
1990]
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extend Customs general search authority to include searches for
currency.7 ' Additionally, the BSA contained contradictory wording.
It stated that a warrant could be applied for if there was reasona-
ble suspicion, but it would be granted only if there was probable
cause.
71
This problem did not present a significant obstacle relative to
persons entering the country. Routine searches for merchandise or
contraband would also uncover concealed currency. However, since
Customs did not have general outbound search authority, out-
bound currency cases were troublesome.76 This problem was ad-
dressed to some degree by performing outbound export control
searches for restricted merchandise that was being shipped to
countries known to be frequent destinations or transhipment
points for smuggled currency.7 Additionally, in the case of out-
bound personal searches, proper questioning by a Customs officer
could produce sufficient cause to search, and the imminent depar-
ture could produce sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless searchs.7  An often utilized alternative was to procure
the traveller's consent. 9
The final legal obstacle faced by Customs was that the BSA
did not provide criminal sanctions for attempted violations of the
statute. The statute penalized the failure to file the required
CMIR.s0 However, since a passenger was required to file the form
at the time of departure from the United States,81 courts held that
a traveller did not violate the BSA until he actually surrendered
his ticket and was ready to board."2
obtained for such searches. Although 31 C.F.R. 103.50(b) states that this section is not in
derogation of authority under any other section, Customs had no specific authority to search
for currency.
74. Rojas, 671 F.2d at 167; United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346, 1349-52 (11th Cir.
1984).
75. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1983) (while the Secretary may apply for a search warrant
based on a reasonable belief that a monetary instrument is being wrongfully transported, a
court may only issue the warrant on a showing of probable cause).
76. Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1351.
77. Roberts Interview, supra note 30.
78. Rojas, 671 F.2d at 166; United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. Rojas, 671 F.2d at 165-66; United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir.
1981).
80. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1983).
81. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(b) (1972).
82. United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); Rojas, 671 F.2d at 165-66.
[Vol. 21:3
TRACING NARCO-DOLLARS
As a result, when agents had ample evidence that an at-
tempted currency transport would be made, they would have to
wait until the actual transport before taking action.88 Conse-
quently, if a major organized crime figure gave a courier
$10,000,000 to take out of the country, Customs could not take ac-
tion against the organized crime figure or the courier until the cou-
rier was about to board the aircraft.8 ' Additionally, if the courier
decided to steal the money, the organized crime figure could not be
charged under the BSA. 5 Finally, if the courier went to a small
landing strip or airport which serviced general aviation aircraft, he
would not violate the BSA until he boarded the private aircraft,
thereby making apprehension prior to departure very difficult."
D. Initial Successes
Despite these initial problems, during the 1970s the BSA was
somewhat effective both as an intelligence tool and as a criminal
enforcement statute.8 7 In one instance, an examination of two
CTRs revealed that a foreign national had deposited more than
$1,000,000 in a three day period without filing any corresponding
CMIRs.88 It was evident that he either smuggled the money in
from another country or had received it after arrival in the United
States." A follow-up investigation disclosed that the monies in-
volved were in fact narcotics payments which the foreign national
had received after arriving in the United States.0
In another case, Customs agents acting on a tip conducted an
extensive examination of the CTR data base, and found twenty-
two CTRs relating to potential criminal activity.9 1 Suspects who
had deposited approximately $74 million were identified and sub-
jected to a grand jury investigation.2 In a third case, Customs ini-
tiated an investigation from an examination of CTRs, and eventu-
ally identified a drug trafficking organization which had been
83. CG REPORT, supra note 33.
84. Id. If the courier waited several days before attempting to depart, surveillance
would have to be maintained until he was ready to leave. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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distributing approximately 300 pounds of heroin per month." Six-
teen persons were convicted as a result of this investigation.9 4
The following advances were also being made: Customs officers
were provided with specialized training in the use and enforcement
of the BSA;95 the IRS initiated 400 CTR-related criminal cases be-
tween 1974-80,16 and planned to make extensive use of CTR data
in future tax investigations;97 and the Treasury Department was
ready, after much delay, to issue the clarifying regulations relative
to the CTR "exempt list" and split deposits."'
III. EMERGENCE OF THE BSA AS A MAJOR WEAPON IN THE DRUG
WAR
During the first half of the 1980s, U.S. law enforcement agen-
cies engaged in more aggressive and effective approaches in enforc-
ing the BSA."' The significant milestones in the government's ef-
forts were the following: Modification of reporting and
recordkeeping requirements;100 the creation of IRS/Customs Fi-
nancial Task Forces throughout the country;' the establishment
of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces in major U.S.
cities; 102 the successful prosecution of several significant investiga-
tions; and, the imposition of major fines and penalties against some
93. Id. at 65-66 (letter from Joseph T. Davis, Acting Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, and John M. Walker, Jr., Treasury Assistant Secretary-Designate (Enforcement & Op-
erations) (June 29, 1981)).
94. Id. at 66.
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id. at 67.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Rusch, supra note 15, at 473. The growth and extent of this enforcement activity is
evidenced by the information which is presented in the following table provided by Rusch:
FY FY FY FY
1982 1983 1984 1985
Investigations Initiated 126 171 238 338
Prosecutions Recommended 55 119 143 174
Indictments 29 103 102 144
Convictions 25 61 73 108
100. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
101. CG REPoRt, supra note 33, at 43.
102. Enforcement and Utilization of the Bank Secrecy Act, 1984: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation on the Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, S. Doc. No. 100, 98th Cong., 2d Seass. 3 (1984) [hereinafter BSA Hear-
ings] (statement of John M. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Enforcement and Operations, De-
partment of the Treasury).
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of the nation's leading banks.108
A. Modification of Reporting and Recordkeeping
Requirements
The first step toward the BSA's effective utilization was the
modification and clarification of the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements. In 1980, the Treasury Department reduced the time
permitted for financial institutions to file CTRs from forty-five to
fifteen days," and required the institutions to retain copies of
CTRs for five years.1 05 The Treasury Department also limited CTR
exemptions to domestic government agencies, certain other finan-
cial institutions, and retail businesses.106 Furthermore, the Trea-
sury Department required financial institutions to review and rec-
ord the identification of customers whose currency deposits met
the reporting requirement thresholds, even in exempt transac-
tions.1 10 7 Additionally, in 1981, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, the Federal Reserve System, and the Comptroller of the
Currency implemented extensive procedures for ensuring that fi-
nancial institutions subject to their oversight complied with the
BSA.'0 8 Finally, in 1985, the Treasury Department, in response to
widespread use of casinos for money laundering,"' implemented
regulations which subjected casinos to the reporting
requirements.1 0
The Government failed to take aggressive action in one area.
In 1981, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that
the Treasury Department revise the dissemination guidelines, so
that BSA data would be more readily available to enforcement
agencies.1 ' These revisions were drafted by Customs in 1982.111
103. PERMANEi4T SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, DoMEsnc MONEY LAUNDERING: BANK SECRECY ACT COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
S. REP. No. 201, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-10 (1986) [hereinafter DML REPORT].
104. 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1972).
105. 31 C.F.R. § 103.32 (1972). The shorter time period significantly reduced the delays
that were hampering ongoing investigations.
106. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(2) (1985).
107. Id. § 103.27.
108. CG REPORT, supra note 33, at 39-43.
109. Casino Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 5065, 5066 (1985).
110. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22, .36, .45 (1985).
111. General Accounting Office Findings on the Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act:
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1986) [hereinafter GAO HEARINGS] (state-




Despite both of these actions, the Treasury Department did not
make any changes in the dissemination guidelines during the first
half of the 1980s."3
B. IRS/Custorns Financial Task Forces
The second significant development during this period was the
establishment of Financial Task Forces by the IRS and Customs.
The first of these task forces was Operation GREENBACK which
was created in Miami, Florida in 1980.114 In 1978, Federal Reserve
Banks in Miami and Jacksonville, Florida had received a surplus of
$3.3 billion in currency from other financial institutions.15 How-
ever, thirty-five other Federal Reserve Banks throughout the coun-
try had a total currency deficit of approximately $3.5 billion during
the same time period. 6 This surplus was an increase from less
than $1 billion in 1974 and was expected to be $6 billion by
1980.117 The Treasury Department suspected that the surplus cash
represented large amounts of currency generated from illegal drug
trafficking. 1 " Operation GREENBACK was formed to address this
suspicion and initially focused on tracking $14 billion dollars de-
posited in Florida Federal Reserve banks.119 IRS and Customs ana-
lyzed the CTRs on file and selected twenty-five banks which had
handled large numbers of cash transactions." 0 These banks, sev-
eral of which handled tens of millions of dollars and one of which
was believed to have handled hundreds of millions, 21 were then
subjected to extensive compliance examinations. 22 By 1984, the
operation resulted in 164 arrests, 211 indictments, 63 convictions,
$38.5 million in seized currency, $7.5 million in seized property,
and $117 million in jeopardy tax assessments.'28
The GREENBACK concept led to similar financial task forces
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. BSA Hearings, supra note 102, at 34.




119. CG REPORT, supra note 33, at 65.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 43.
123. BSA Hearings, supra note 102, at 34.
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composed of Customs and IRS agents supported by the Justice De-
partments in thirty-five major cities.1 2' In fiscal year 1983 alone,
task force investigations led to the indictment of 497 persons and
to 279 convictions.125 Between 1980 and 1984, they disrupted at
least fifteen major money laundering organizations which had
laundered over $2.5 billion in primarily drug proceeds. ' 26 Among
the more significant investigations pursued by the task forces were
those of the Great American Bank,1 2 7 Eduardo Orozco,1 28 and the
Bank of Boston.129
1. The Great American Bank Investigation
The Great American Bank investigation involved a bank's
criminal complicity in failing to file 406 CTRs covering more than
$94 million in deposits during a one year period. 13 0 The depositors
agreed to maintain large accounts and to pay a fee to certain em-
ployees of Great American Bank.3 In exchange, the Bank agreed
to the following: to refrain from filing the required CTRs; to issue
cashier's checks disguised as loans; and to transfer the monies by
wire, cashier's check, and bank checks through foreign and inter-
state accounts.
1 3 2
2. The Orozco Organization
In the Orozco investigation, several banks and a curiency ex-
change house had disregarded the BSA's reporting requirements. 13 3
The investigation uncovered the laundering of millions of dollars
in cocaine and heroin proceeds for the Colombian cocaine cartels
and La Cosa Nostra heroin traffickers. 3 4 The case began when
Orozco's attorney advised Federal authorities that Orozco was
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 35.
127. United States v. Great American Bank of Dade Co., 578 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Fla.
1983).
128. United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, CR 85 52-MA (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1985).
130. PCOC REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
131. Id. at 40.
132. Id. One of the depositors, Interfil, a front company with no legitimate business
made daily deposits over $250,000 which were delivered to the Bank in boxes and suitcases.
Id.
133. Id. at 39. See also Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076.
134. PCOC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 35.
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making frequent sizable cash deposits into numerous bank ac-
counts.135 With Citibank's assistance, the DEA put an undercover
agent in the bank to launder Orozco's cash.136 In all, Orozco used
eleven banks and a currency exchange house to illegally launder
over $150 million dollars. 37 A subsequent investigation disclosed
that the currency exchange house, Deak-Perera, laundered almost
$100 million for Orozco without filing CTRs or CMIRs.'58 Deak-
Perera claimed it was ignorant of the reporting requirements. 5 In
addition, only one of the eleven banks involved notified the au-
thorities, although four had become so suspicious that they refused
further deposits.'" As in the Great American Bank case, this in-
vestigation showed the blatant disregard of the BSA's require-
ments by some of the nation's major financial institutions."' De-
spite numerous regulations imposed upon and substantially
followed by legitimate banks, the Orozco organization had been
able to launder almost $100 million in drug proceeds. The launder-
ing went largely undetected by the Government because some in-
stitutions, willfully or otherwise, were ignoring the regulations.
3. The Bank of Boston Case
As a result of severe penalties imposed upon several major
banks for non-compliance with the BSA's requirements, financial
institutions increased their awareness of, and compliance with, the
reporting requirements. The first of these cases was Bank of Bos-
ton, in which the Bank admitted its failure to file CTRs on depos-
its and international transactions in excess of $1 billion between
1980 and 1984.1"1 The Bank was assessed and paid a criminal fine
135. Id. at 35-36.
136. Id. at 36. Eventually, Orozco put the agent on commission in exchange for his not
filing the required CTRs. Id.
137, Id. at 37. Orozco changed small denomination bills into larger denominations,
made multiple deposits under $10,000 to avoid the CTR requirements, established fictitious
shell corporations, and used false bills of lading to substantiate and transfer monies among
import and export companies. Id.
138. Id. Deak-Perera opened the accounts without requiring identification and received
much of the money in cash deposit amounts of $500,000, $3.4 million of which was trans-
ferred to accounts in the United States, Panama, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. Id.
139. Id. at 38.
140. Id. at 38-39.
141. Additional examples of significant cases in this period may be found in the PCOC
REPORT, supra note 2, at 42-49.
142. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, CR 85 52-MA (plea agreement and prosecutor's infor-




In the wake of the Bank of Boston case and its surrounding
publicity, over sixty banks and bank holding companies voluntarily
advised the Treasury Department of past violations of the Act. ""
By June of 1986, eighteen civil penalties ranging from $75,000 to
$4.75 million had been assessed under the BSA.' In addition,
CTR filings increased from approximately 700,000 in 1984 to 1.8
million in 1985, and up to 3 million by mid-1986. 18 The banking
industry was no longer indifferent toward the BSA.
C. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
The success of the Treasury Department's financial task forces
led to the creation of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces composed of agents from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the IRS, Cus-
toms, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), as
well as attorneys from the offices of the United States Attorney.147
These task forces absorbed the already existing Treasury Depart-
ment task forces in those cities where both existed.148 By the mid-
dle of 1984, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
had initiated 632 investigations which resulted in the indictment of
2,758 defendants, 66 of whom were charged with violations of the
BSA.'4 9 By 1986, they had initiated 1,350 cases which resulted in
the indictments of 8,649 individuals."' The most prominent task
force investigation during this time was "The Pizza Connection."' 5'
The "Pizza Connection" investigation involved the laundering
of heroin trafficking profits through major banks and investment
143. DML REPoRT, supra note 103, at 3-4. The bank pled guilty, although it was only a
matter of negligence when a first line supervisor had misinterpreted a change in the regula-
tions. Id.
144. GAO HEARINGS, supra note 111, at 17 (testimony of Francis A. Keating II, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury, Enforcement).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Id. at 16.
148. CG REPORT, supra note 33.
149. BSA Hearings, supra note 102, at 98.
150. GAO HEARINGS, supra note 111, at 16 (testimony of Francis A. Keating II, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury, Enforcement).
151. United States v. Badalamenti, 810 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1987); 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1986); 663 F. Supp. 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 663 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 626 F. Supp.
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 626 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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houses by the Cosa Nostra and Italian Mafia organized crime
figures."' The conspiracy first came to light when couriers were
found transferring tens of millions of dollars in $5, $10, and $20
denominations through these financial institutions to Switzerland
and Italy.15' Additionally, the investigation disclosed that money
was also being transported by private jet to Bermuda, and by com-
modity account transfers from local brokerage houses to Switzer-
land.' " The monies in Switzerland and Bermuda were then being
transferred to Italy to pay for opium and to finance narcotics labo-
ratories, all in apparent violation of the BSA.'
Franco Della Torre, the primary courier in the "Pizza Connec-
tion," had laundered almost $5 million through an account at Mer-
rill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith before the broker became sus-
picious and refused to accept additional deposits." When Merrill
Lynch closed the account, the courier moved his business to an-
other stock broker, E.F. Hutton, where he laundered another $13
million using the money primarily to purchase commodity futures
contracts in Switzerland.16 7 Unfortunately, when the Government
served E.F. Hutton with a grand jury subpoena for records of the
accounts, E.F. Hutton immediately advised its Switzerland office,
.which in turn advised Della Torre's associate." Della Torre made
no further deposits, but had already laundered over $25 million in
a two year period. 59 Twenty defendants were prosecuted and con-
victed in the case; Della Torre was also convicted of Swiss law
violations. 160
This case demonstrated the following problems with the gov-
ernment's attack on money laundering: The difficulty in detecting
or tracking cash physically transported from the country without
the filing of a CMIR; the apparent willingness of banks and bro-
152. PCOC REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-35.
153. Id. at 33.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 33-34. Merrill Lynch became suspicious because of the amount of cash in-
volved and because the courier was reluctant to be filmed by the surveillance cameras at
Banker's Trust which acted as an intermediary in transporting the currency. Id.
157. Id. at 34. Della Torre stopped making deposits when E.F. Hutton, despite Govern-
ment requests to the contrary, notified a Della Torre associate that the Government had
served a Grand Jury subpoena for records of some of the accounts. Id.
158. Id. at 34-35.
159. Id. at 35.
160. Secretary of the Treasury, Money Laundering and the Bank Secrecy Act: The
Question of Foreign Branches of Domestic Financial Institutions 21 (1987).
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kerage houses to engage in highly suspicious transactions; and, the
inclination of financial institutions to advise customers of ongoing
investigations. 161
D. Legal Obstacles to the BSA in the 1980s
In addition to the problems mentioned above, legal obstacles
were still hampering the government's efforts during this period.
First, the legal problems of Customs search authority and the lack
of an "attempt" provision had not yet been resolved.1"' Second,
"structuring" or "smurfing," that is the splitting of cash transac-
tions to avoid the CTR requirement, was considered legal by many
courts around the country.1"'
The leading case concerning Customs lack of search authority
was United States v. Chemaly. T'6 In Chemaly, the DEA received a
tip from a previously reliable source that Chemaly would be flying
from Miami to Aruba to purchase cocaine with $500,000 concealed
in a cardboard box. 65 Chemaly boarded the flight without the
cardboard box, but a search of his person and attache case dis-
closed in excess of $5,000 cash. 6' Since he had notice of the report-
ing requirement and had denied having more than $5,000 in his
possession, he was arrested and convicted for violating the BSA.
1 67
The circuit court reversed his conviction, holding that the Govern-
ment was not relieved from the BSA's probable cause and warrant
requirements by either the border exception, Chemaly's involun-
tary consent, or by a search incident to an arrest supported by
probable cause.16
Congress attempted to resolve this problem with the enact-
ment of the Crime Control Act 'of 1984.169 This Act granted Cus-
toms officers the authority to search for currency on the basis of
reasonable cause, that is, reason to believe that currency was con-
161. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
162. H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 301-03, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3480-82. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
163. GAO HEARINGS, supra note 111, at 33-34 (statement of William J. Anderson, Di-
rector, General Government Division, General Accounting Office).
164. 741 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 1348.
166. Id. at 1348-49.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1353-54.
169. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 901(c)-(d), 98 Stat. 2135 (1984) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316-5317 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
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cealed. 170 However, despite the amendment, some courts inter-
preted "reasonable cause to believe" as requiring probable cause.17
1
Additionally, Congress tried to resolve the "attempt" problem in
the 1984 Act by adding the phrase "attempt to transport or have
transported" to-the BSA."7 2 However, this phrasing still presented
problems in the courts, and in 1986, Congress replaced it with the
phrase "transports, is about to transport, or has transported.' 73
The 1984 Act also empowered Customs and the IRS to pay up
to 25% of the monies forfeited or recovered in fines and penalties
resulting from BSA violations to persons providing original infor-
mation leading to seizures and forfeitures.174 This provided finan-
cial incentives for persons with knowledge of money laundering ac-
tivities to provide Customs and the IRS with information leading
to seizures. From 1984 to 1986, Customs currency seizures in-
creased from $67 million to $96 million.175 During the three week
period of Operation BUCKSTOP, Customs seized more than $7
million in smuggled currency. 1 7  Finally, the 1984 Act raised the
reporting threshold for the CMIR filing requirement from $5,000
to $10,000. This was done in order to focus efforts on relatively
large transactions, reduce the paperwork involved in administering
the BSA, and lessen the negative impact of the Act on travelers.
1 77
While these legislative initiatives were quite important, the
more serious problem of structuring still remained. Circuit courts
170. Id. at § 901(d)(2), 98 Stat. 2135 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5317
(1983 & Supp. VI 1989)). That provision states:
[A] customs officer may stop, search, without a search warrant, a vehicle, vessel,
aircraft, or other conveyance, envelope or other container, or person entering or
departing from the United States with respect to which or whom the officer has
reasonable cause to believe there is a monetary instrument being transported in
violation of section 5316 of this title.
171. United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043
(1988); United States v. Turner, 813 F. Supp. 982 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
172. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(c)(1), 98 Stat. 2135 (1984) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5316 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
173. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1358(b), 100 Stat. 3207-26-27
(1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1) (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
174. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(e), 98 Stat. 2135-36 (1984) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5323
(Supp. VI 1989)).
175. Federal Accounting of Seized Cash in Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Federal Spending, Budget, and Accounting of the Senate Comm. on Governmen-
tal Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987) (testimony of William von Raab, Commissioner
of Customs).
176. Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 302, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3482.
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were split on the issue of whether the deliberate structuring of de-
posits to avoid the CTR requirements was a crime. 78 The leading
case holding individuals conducting such transactions criminally li-
able was United States v. Tobon-Builes . 79 In that case, Tobon-
Builes and a companion purchased one cashier's check each for
just under $10,000 at ten different banks in one day.'80 The two
entered the banks separately and went to different tellers, thereby
concealing the fact that they were together and that the transac-
tions were related.118 The trial court convicted Tobon-Builes of
structuring currency transactions in excess of $10,000 in order to
avoid filing CTRs with the Government. 8 He appealed, arguing
that as a bank customer, he had no legal duty to report the trans-
actions, and without such a duty, he could not be found guilty of
concealment.8 s The circuit court found that, although he was not
guilty of actual concealment, he was guilty of causing the banks'
failure to file the reports, and consequently was criminally liable.
84
The court reasoned that Tobon-Builes' criminal intent to cause the
concealment, and the banks' failure to fulfill their duty formed ac-
tionable concealment. 18
6
The leading case holding that money structuring was not a
crime was United States v. Anzalone.'8 a During a two week period,
Anzalone purchased $100,000 worth of bank checks with cash
amounts just under $10,000."'I Anzalone was convicted of conceal-
ing a material fact from the Government, of aiding and abetting,
and of causing the bank's failure to file the required CTRssa The
circuit court held that the conviction could not be sustained under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment because the Govern-
178. See United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) affirming convic-
tions. See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.
1986) reversing convictions.
179. 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983).
180. Id. at 1094.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1096. Tobon-Builes was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for knowingly and
willfully concealing a material fact from the government.
183. Id. at 1098.
184. Id. at 1098-1101.
185. Id. at 1101.
186. 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985).
187. Id. at 679.
188. Id. at 679-80. Anzalone was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 of concealing a mate-
rial fact, and under 18 U.S.C. § 2 of causing a financial institution's failure to file a CTR.
1990]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
ment did not establish that Anzalone had any legal duty to dis-
close the material facts at the time of the transactions.1 89
The uncertainty generated by the conflicting case law was
eventually resolved when Congress codified the holding in Tobon-
Builes and expressly made money structuring a crime.190 Recently,
however, courts have held that a defendant need not be aware that
structuring a currency transaction is unlawful in order to be con-
victed of a willful violation of the statute.' Nonetheless, the codi-
fication of Tobon-Builes, and other changes to the BSA, were in-
corporated when Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986.192
IV. THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT OF 1986
A. Legislative Background
The MLCA amended and substantially improved the BSA,
eliminated some of the requirements of the RFPA, and, most im-
portantly, made money laundering itself a crime.9 3 This section
examines these important changes, explores the criminal prosecu-
tion of a major financial institution, and explains the emerging
concepts of "imputed knowledge" and "collective knowledge"
under which financial institutions may be found criminally liable,
even in the absence of specific knowledge and intent.
Among the amendments to the BSA were the following: The
prohibition against structuring;' the elimination of the "reasona-
ble cause to believe" requirement in border searches; 95 the author-
ity, in CMIR cases, to seize not only the monetary instruments in-
189. Id. at 678, 683.
190. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 18-22 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
191. United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485 (2nd Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Hoyland, 903 F.2d
1288 (9th Cir. 1990).
192. Title I, Subtitle H, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207-22 (1986)(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1989), scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. (1984 & Supp. V 1989), and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5316, 5317(b) & (c), 5318(a)(3), (a)(4),
(f), 5322(b), 5324 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989).
193. Id. at 100 Stat. 5207-18-22 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (Supp. V
1989)).
194. Id. § 1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207-22 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. VI
1989)).
195. Id. § 1355(a), 100 Stat. 3207-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b)
(1983 & Supp VI 1989)).
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volved, but any traceable proceeds; 9 the requirement that
financial institutions maintain statements justifying CTR exemp-
tions;19 7 an increase in criminal penalties from five years to ten
years;1 8 and an increase in civil penalties from $10,000 to $25,000
of the amount of the transaction (not to exceed $100,000), with a
specific clarification that civil penalties were additional to any
criminal penalty exacted.'" e
The two amendments to the RFPA were especially significant.
The first specified that banks could voluntarily provide names, ac-
count numbers and suspicious activities to the Government with-
out violating the RFPA or exposing themselves to prosecution
under state or local privacy statutes.2 0 0 The second re-emphasized
the courts' authority to prohibit financial institutions from disclos-
ing to their customers that grand jury subpoenas or other court
orders had been served upon the customer's account."1
However, the most significant accomplishment of the MLCA
was the establishment of distinct money laundering offenses. The
statute established five separate money laundering violations:
1) knowingly conducting or attempting to conduct a financial
transaction with the proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity"
and with the intent to promote a "specified unlawful activity;
202
2) knowingly conducting or attempting to conduct a financial
196. Id. § 1355(b), 100 Stat. 3207-23 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)
(1983 & Supp VI 1989)).
197. Id. §1356(a), (b), & (c)(2), 100 Stat. 3207-23-24 (1986) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5318(f) (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
198. Id. § 1357(g), 100 Stat. 3207-26 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5322
(1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
199. Id. § 1357, 100 Stat. 3207-25 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)
(1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
200. Id. § 1353(a), 100 Stat. 3207-21-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
3403(c) (1989)).
201. Id. § 1353(b), 100 Stat. 3207-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i)
(1989)). Originally, 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) had been intended to exempt institutions from Pri-
vacy Act notification requirements in these cases, but some courts had misinterpreted the
provision as ensuring even greater notice to customers. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 628 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum, 575 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
202. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 3207-
18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1989)). The "specified unlawful
activities" include: RICO violations, narcotics trafficking, bribery, counterfeiting, securities
violations, smuggling, bank robbery, embezzlement, espionage, kidnapping, and illegal ex-
ports of munitions and technology. Id. § 1352(c), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-20 (1986) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. V 1989)).
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transaction with the proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity,"
knowing that the transaction was designed to conceal the nature,
location, source, or ownership of the proceeds or to avoid the CTR
or CMIR reporting requirements; 0 3
3) importing or exporting monetary instruments with the in-
tent to promote a "specified unlawful activity;' 204
4) importing or exporting monetary instruments with the in-
tent to disguise the nature or source of the proceeds; 205 and
5) knowingly engaging or attempting to engage in a monetary
transaction with criminally derived property valued at more than
$10,000 derived from a "specified unlawful activity."2 06
Additionally, the MLCA added the considerable resources of
the FBI and DEA to the Government's effort.2"' Although it did
not alter the exclusive jurisdiction of the IRS2 8 and Customs 0 9 to
enforce the reporting requirements of the BSA,21 * it granted the
FBI and DEA overall responsibility for investigating the newly es-
tablished crime of money laundering.2 1' Furthermore, the MLCA
required the Treasury and Justice Departments to formalize a
memorandum of understanding between them to ensure coordina-
tion among the law enforcement agencies involved.21
B. Enforcement of the MLCA and the Amended BSA
After the MLCA was enacted, many significant investigations
were prosecuted under the combined statutes. U.S. v. Bank of New
England is noteworthy because of its legal significance to financial
203. Id. § 1352(a)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.§ 1956(a)(1)(B)
(Supp. V 1989)).
204. Id. § 1352(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. V 1989)).
205. Id. § 1352(a)(2)(B), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1989)).
206. Id. § 1352(b), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. V
1989)).
207. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(e) &
1957(e) (Supp. V 1989)).
208. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
209. See supro note 31 and accompanying text.
210. See CG REPORT, supra note 33, at 7-10; GAO HEARINGS, supra note 111, at 34
(statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division, General Ac-
counting Office).
211. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(e) &




institutions. ' s U.S. v. Awan and U.S. v. Escobar-Gaviria are inter-
esting because they demonstrate the complexities of sophisticated
money laundering operations and investigations."'
1. Bank of New England
The most significant case from a legal point of view was
United States v. Bank of New England,2 15 which established new
principles of culpability for financial institutions. This case in-
volved an individual who purchased multiple counterchecks on
thirty-one different occasions." 6 He made these payable to cash in
amounts ranging from $5,000 to $9,000.217 He simultaneously
presented two to four previously purchased counter checks to the
bank and received a lump sum in excess of $10,000.218 The Bank
did not file CTRs on these transactions because each was below
the $10,000 threshold.21 9 The Bank appealed its conviction for fail-
ing to file the CTRs and asserted that its violation was not willful
as required by the BSA.2 2 0
In sustaining the Bank's conviction, the circuit court made
three significant findings of law. First, it held that if any of the
Bank's employees knew of the reporting requirements, that knowl-
edge was imputed to the Bank.2 1 Second, the Bank's imputed
knowledge was the total of its employees' knowledge within the
scope of their employment.2 22 Third, the Bank's flagrant organiza-
tional indifference to the responsibilities as established under the
law was equivalent to willfulness.221 3 The combination of "imputed
knowledge," "collective knowledge," and a gross negligence stan-
213. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 943 (1987).
214. United States v. Awan, No. S88-330-Cr-T-13(B) (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 1988) (criminal
indictment); United States v. Escobar-Gaviria, No. CR 89-086A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 1989)
(criminal indictment).
215. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
216. Id. at 849. Counter checks are blank checks issued by a bank which a bank teller
encodes with the customer's account number. Id.




221. Id. at 856.
222. Id.
223. Id. The court quoted the Supreme Court as holding "willfulness," in both civil and




dard resulted in the Bank's vicarious criminal liability. This case
established a lower standard of proof for criminal convictions of
financial institutions.2
2. Operation C-CHASE
Operation C-CHASE involved a money laundering syndicate
and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) which
allegedly laundered millions of dollars in narcotics proceeds in vio-
lation of the MLCA, but not in violation of the BSA.2 ' C-CHASE
was a two year undercover operation in which Customs agents dis-
guised themselves as money launderers and offered their "services"
to a major money laundering syndicate which was handling the
monies of the Medellin cartel,22 6 and Manuel Noriega, the deposed
dictator of Panama.2 7 The undercover agents established their
base of operations in Tampa, Florida, laundered currency for the
syndicate, and eventually reached into the cartel in Medellin,
Colombia.22
18
The syndicate employed several different money laundering
schemes involving sixty-four domestic and sixty-five foreign bank
accounts.229 Initially, the undercover agents picked up narcotics
cash proceeds in several different cities. 2"0 They then either depos-
ited the cash in a local bank in the pick-up city and wire trans-
ferred it to an undercover account in Tampa, or physically trans-
ported it to Tampa and deposited it in the account.2 1 The
syndicate then used the agents' signed blank checks as negotiable
instruments." 2 It would complete the checks and either draw upon
the funds, give the checks to the owner of the funds, or sell them
on the currency black market.2 3
As time went on, the syndicate developed two more ap-
224. For a critical look at the legal ramifications of this case, see Villa, supra note 3, at
497-500.
225. Awan, No. S88-330-Cr-T-13(B).
226. 134 CONG. REc. $16026 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (Documents released by U.S. Cus-
toms Service) [hereinafter 134 CONG. Rac.].
227. Gerth, Case Against Bank May Shed Light on Noriega's Finances, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
228. 134 CONG. REc., supra note 226, at S16027-28.
229. Id. at S16027.






proaches to money laundering. Under one approach, the funds
were wire transferred from the undercover account in Tampa to
another undercover account at BCCI in Panama.2"" The syndicate
would then complete pre-signed blank checks drawn on the ac-
count by the undercover agents, and would either give the checks
to the owners of the funds or sell them on the black market.2"
Under the second approach, adopted at the suggestion of BCCI,
the funds were wire transferred from the Tampa undercover ac-
count, via a New York bank, to a foreign bank where ninety-day
certificates of deposit were purchased.2' The undercover agents
would then meet with a BCCI officer in Miami, and sign docu-
ments reflecting a loan by BCCI, Panama, guaranteed by the cer-
tificates of deposit.3 7 The loan proceeds would then be wired to an
undercover account at BCCI, Panama, on which the undercover
agents had already drawn blank checks which had been given to
the syndicate.2 38
In 1988, the syndicate initiated a more complex scheme in-
volving nine corporations established in four foreign countries.23 '
In a typical transaction, the funds on deposit in a Tampa under-
cover account were wire transferred through New York to BCCI,
Luxembourg, to BCCI, London, where they were used to purchase
a certificate of deposit.24 The certificate was then used as collat-
eral for a loan from BCCI, Nassau, with the proceeds being wired
back to the undercover account in Tampa, and then, to a Uru-
guayan bank account in the name of the owner of the funds.2 1
Announced as the most significant money laundering case in
history, 4" C-CHASE resulted in the indictment of BCCI, two of its
subsidiaries, a British financial services company, and ten individ-
uals in France, England, and the United States for laundering $31





238. Id. at 816026-27.
239. Id. at S16027.
240. Id.
241. Id,
242. Isikoff, U.S. Links Bank to Drug Cartel, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
243. Awan, No. S88-330-Cr-T-13(B).
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3. Operation POLAR CAP
In a similar FBI operation, POLAR CAP, the Government in-
dicted Banco de Occidente and ten persons, including such nota-
bles as Pablo Escobar-Gaviria and Jorge Ochoa-Vasquez, two lead-
ers of the Medellin cartel.14 4 The defendants were charged with
various drug offenses and with laundering in excess of one billion
dollars in drug proceeds.2" Most of the defendants used the same
methods as those encountered in C-CHASE, '2 4 and some defend-
ants had already been indicted in C-CHASE for their money laun-
dering activities.
4 7
An additional scheme employed by the syndicate in Operation
POLAR CAP was the use of fictitious invoices, bills of lading, and
other commercial paper, purportedly representing the importation
of commercial goods from outside the United States.'48 The subse-
quent wire transfers of drug proceeds were then fraudulently rep-
resented by the purported corporate "owners" of the monies as
payments for the commercial goods allegedly imported into the
United States.2 49
Operation POLAR CAP revealed two positive aspects of the
Government's drive against money laundering. First, that many
enforcement agencies are conducting extensive money laundering
investigations, including numerous sting operations. In Operation
POLAR CAP, the syndicate encountered separate undercover FBI,
DEA, and Customs operations.6 0 Money laundering syndicates
and narcotics trafficking organizations must constantly avoid these
undercover operations. Second, the investigations can lead to both
the indictment of money launderers and leaders of the narcotics
trafficking organizations." 1
V. THE MONEY LAUNDERING PROSECUTION IMPROVEMENTS ACT
In 1988, with the passage of the Money Laundering Prosecu-
244. Escobar-Gaviria, No. CR89-086A.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 8-10. See also 134 CoNG. REc., supra note 226, at S16029.
247. Escobar-Gaviria, No. CR89-086A.
248. Id. at 10-11.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id. at 1-2.
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tion Improvements Act (1988 Act), 52 Congress made some signifi-
cant improvements to the Government's effort to counter money
laundering.
A. The RFPA
Congress amended the RFPA and abolished the notice re-
quirement applicable when a government agency discovers records
of potential criminal violations while performing normal regulatory
duties.253 Congress also abolished the notice requirement imposed
on financial institutions when the matter involved an institutional
insider.25 Finally, it provided a "good faith" defense to liability for
disclosures relative to insiders. 5
B. The BSA
The 1988 Act amended the BSA in several important respects.
Among the more significant amendments to the BSA was the ex-
pansion of the definition of "financial institution" to include the
following: automobile, airplane, and boat dealers; persons involved
in real estate closings; the United States Postal Service; any gov-
ernment agency carrying out the business of a financial institution;
and any other business designated by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury. 56 The 1988 Act also required financial institutions to obtain
and retain identifying data on non-customers purchasing bank
checks, cashier's checks, traveller's checks, or money orders for
$3,000 or more in cash. "5' Additionally, it authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to lower the reporting requirement threshold to
any level he desired in specifically designated geographical areas
for periods of up to sixty days.208 Finally, the 1988 Act required
252. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354-59, & 4378
(1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1120, 3412-3413 (1989), 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp.
V 1989), and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5326 (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
253. Id. § 6186(b), 102 Stat. 4357 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3412(f)
(1989)).
254. Id. § 6186(c), 102 Stat. 4358 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3413
(1989)).
255. Id. § 6186(d), 102 Stat. 4358 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3417(c)
(1989)).
256. Id. § 6185(a), 102 Stat. 4354, 4354-57 (1988) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
5312(a)(2) (1983 & Supp. VI 1989)).
257. Id. § 6185(b), 102 Stat. 4354, 4355 (1988) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (Supp. VI
1989)).
258. Id. § 6185(b), 102 Stat. 4354, 4355-57 (1988) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5326 (Supp.
VI 1989)).
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the Secretary of the Treasury to study the feasibility of withdraw-
ing $50 and $100 bills from circulation.2 5 '
C. The MLCA
The 1988 Act exempted attorney fees from the MLCA provi-
sions prohibiting transactions involving illegal proceeds2 60 Fur-
thermore, the Act extended the "specified unlawful activities" to
include income tax violations.2 6' It also broadened the MLCA's
coverage to include wire transfers."22
In response to an outcry from defense attorneys alleging that
they could be convicted of violating the law if they were paid with
the proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity," Congress added an
exemption for attorney fees. Attorneys also asserted that the stat-
ute denied such persons legal representation, thereby depriving de-
fendants of their constitutional right to counsel under the sixth
amendment.263  Significantly, the exemption does not cover all
transactions with attorneys, only those necessary to preserve the
right to counsel under the sixth amendment.
2
"
An interesting aspect of the amendment making income tax
evasion a "specified unlawful activity" is that tax evasion was one
of Congress' primary concerns in enacting the BSA in 1970.28 5 It
now appears that the Government's primary emphasis is on nar-
cotics trafficking, with tax evasion simply broadening the Govern-
ment's possible enforcement avenues.
The fact that the MLCA's coverage was expanded to include
wire transfers is evidence of Congress' recognition that in most
259. Id. § 6187, 102 Stat. 4358-59.
260. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6182, 102 Stat. 4354 (1988) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (Supp. V 1989)).
261. Id. § 6471(a), 102 Stat. 4378 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1989)).
262. Id. § 6471(b), 102 Stat. 4378 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)
(Supp. V 1989)).
263. See Garland & Samuel, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Will Attorneys
Be Taken to the Cleaners?, 24 GA. ST. B.J. 186 (1988); Note, Making Criminal Defense a
Crime Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957, 41 VAND. L. REv. 543 (1988); Comment, Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 19 PAc. L.J.
171 (1987).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (Supp. V 1989).
265. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4394, 4395.
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cases, such as BCCI and Operation POLAR CAP, wire transfers
were frequently used by money laundering organizations. The




Many obstacles still impede the success of the United States
effort to combat the laundering of illegal drug proceeds, including:
the increasing use of "front companies" and "boutique banks" to
conceal illegitimate transactions; the rising use of wire transfers to
avoid reporting requirements; the continued practice of smuggling
currency out of the country; and the recurring problems that arise
when the laundered proceeds, the launderers, and owners of these
proceeds are beyond the jurisdiction of United States courts.
A. Front Companies67
"Front companies," especially those on the exempt list, are
used to funnel illegal cash into the legitimate financial network.2S
Since financial transactions of exempted customers are not re-
ported to the Treasury Department, an analysis of the financial
databases can not reveal suspicious activities.
26 9
One solution to this problem would be to abolish the exempt
lists. However, the Treasury Department is already overwhelmed.
It processes approximately 600,000 CTRs a month,2 ' 0 and, with an
existing backlog of 45 days for data input,'2 7 1 probably could not
handle the increased workload.272 Therefore, there seems to be lit-
266. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., ist Sess. 1-2 (Nov. 1, 1989), printed in TRANSCnr OF PRO-
CEDINGS [hereinafter DMLCE] at 6 (statement of Senator Dixon).
267. CG REPoRT, supra note 33. "Front Companies" are businesses with little or no
legitimate activity established to cover illegal activities, in this case, money laundering.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. H.R. REP. No. 70, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988). However, note that this figure is
denied by Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement, Salvatore Martoche. Interna-
tional Money Laundering: Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy Before the Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REC. D1121 (October 4, 1989) (testimony of Salvatore
R. Martoche, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement) [hereinafter Martoche
Testimony].
271. Id. at 25.
272. Meddis, Drug Probe Drowning in Paperwork, U.S.A. Today, Sept. 28, 1989, at 1,
col. 4.
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tle justification for the Treasury Department's requirement that
legitimate banks and other financial institutions file more reports.
An alternative approach would be to depend on the banks'
knowledge of their customers. There have been several steps in
this direction already. Under the BSA's present requirement, insti-
tutions make the appropriate inquiries and record their justifica-
tion for placing customers on the exempt list.27  The institutions
are also required to report suspicious activity.174 This effort has al-
ready been somewhat successful. 270 The banks know what to look
for, 2 7  and due to their experience, are in a position to recognize
suspicious activities almost intuitively. Furthermore, the American
Banker's Association Money Laundering Task Force was created
by the banks to work with the Government in addressing the
money laundering problem.27 7 The creation of a group of non-gov-
ernment financial experts to address money laundering is a major
step forward, even if their motivation might be somewhat self-serv-
ing. With this added help from financial institutions, the Govern-
ment's overall effort may be more effective.
B. Boutique Banks
278
Since "boutique banks" have the opportunity to use and ma-
nipulate all of the financial services available to banks, including
273. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(0(1983 & Supp. VI 1989).
274. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1988).
275. The Government has received almost 300 Criminal Referral Forms or Reports of
Apparent Crimes. For example, a tip to the IRS from a bank teller at the Bank of America
led to the seizure of forty-five tons of marijuana and hashish seized in San Francisco on the
barge Intrepid Voyager. H.R. REP. No. 70, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1988).
276. PCOC REPORT, supra note 2, at 54-55. The telltale signs, which may also be ob-
servable in legitimate transactions, are:
1) An individual making unusual cash deposits;
2) An individual who uses his accounts only as a temporary depository for funds transferred
foreign;
3) Corporate accounts whose transactions are dominated by cash;
4) A customer who provides minimal, fictitious, or vague information;
5) An individual engaging in repeated transactions beneath the reporting threshold;
6) A customer who maintains an unusually large number of accounts; and
7) A customer who makes frequent wire transfers to narcotics sources or transit countries or
nations with secrecy laws.
277. DMLCE, supra note 266, at 137-39 (statement of Boris Meinikoff, Vice Chair, Am.
Banker's Ass'n Money Laundering Task Force).
278. Roberts, supro note 30. Boutique banks are very small banks, usually consisting of
a single room in an office building, which are established for the specific purpose of launder-
ing money.
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the exempt list, letters of credit, certificates of deposit, large de-
nomination bills, and wire transfers, they are an ideal avenue for
money laundering.2 79 Furthermore, since many of their transac-
tions, such as obtaining $100 bills from the Federal Reserve, wire
transfers, and letters of credit, etc., are conducted through large
corresponding banks, their activities are concealed from the Trea-
sury Department.'80
One way of addressing this problem is to require larger legiti-
mate banks to know their customers, in this case "boutique
banks."' 81 The Treasury Department is working closely with the
financial community and has established a system for financial in-
stitutions to report suspicious activities.282 However, not all insti-
tutions are as attentive to potential money laundering as they
could be. For example, in a pending investigation, one Miami
"boutique bank" was exporting $10 million every week in brand
new, closely packed, hermetically sealed packages of $100 bills ob-
tained from the Federal Reserve through a large corresponding
bank.8 s The amount the "boutique bank" exported to a single
South American country in one year was over seven times the total
value of imports to the United States from that nation.2 8" Since
the "boutique bank" obtained the currency through a large corre-
sponding bank, the Federal Reserve Bank had no reason to become
suspicious. However, the corresponding bank should have ques-
tioned the boutique bank's request for $10 million a week in new
$100 bills. Because CMIRs were being filed by the courier, an anal-
ysis of the CMIR database by Customs should have disclosed the
suspicious currency exports. 85
In the future, the Treasury Department should be able to ob-
tain improved analysis of the available data with its creation of the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN). ss FINCEN is
designed to become the focal point of all money laundering intelli-
gence activities, as well as a clearinghouse for the exchange of in-
formation and coordination of investigations among the various




282. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
283. CG REPORT, supra note 33.
284. Id.
285. Id.




Another way of addressing the "boutique bank" problem is for
the Treasury Department to work more closely with federal and
state regulatory agencies in examining "boutique bank" records.
FINCEN should also help to improve the level of cooperation
among law enforcement and regulatory agencies overseeing smaller
financial institutions. However, it is incumbent upon the Treasury
Department and the law enforcement agencies to launch an aggres-
sive campaign to educate state regulatory agencies overseeing the
smaller state chartered banks, so that regulators will recognize and
report indications of money laundering activity.
C. International Wire Transfers
As evidenced in Operations C-CHASE 258 and POLAR CAP,2 89
wire transfers have emerged as a primary device used by many
high volume money launderers.2 90 In response to this problem, on
October 31, 1989, the Treasury Department published alternative
approaches under consideration for additional recordkeeping and
reporting requirements.2 9 The following were among the options
considered:
2'2
1. Requiring financial institutions to report all international
wire transactions, including the identities and accounts involved,
as well as a statement by the customer as to whether the sender or
receiver is aware of any separate payment instructions unknown to
the financial institution.293 This requirement could be coupled with
an exemption for most normal business transactions;
2 94
2. Requiring all international wire transfer messages to contain
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 225-43 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
290. DMLCE, supra note 266, at 6 (statement of Senator Dixon).
291. Bank Secrecy Act Regulatory Applications to the Problem of Money Laundering
Through International Payments, 54 Fed. Reg. 45769-71 (1989). Authority to impose such
requirements is contained in 31 U.S.C. § 5314, under which the Secretary of the Treasury
shall require reports or records relating to transactions between persons subject to the juris-
diction of the United States and "a foreign financial agency." Such authority is also found
in 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2), under which the Secretary may require that domestic financial
institutions "maintain appropriate procedures" to ensure compliance with any regulation
prescribed under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 (1988).
292. 54 Fed. Reg. at 45770.




all known third-party identifying data;296
3. Requiring financial institutions to apply model "know your
customer" procedures to verify the legitimate nature of a cus-
tomer's business and that the customer's transfers are commensu-
rate with legitimate business activities; 96
4. Requiring special identification and recordkeeping or re-
porting procedures with respect to senders or recipients of interna-
tional wire transfers who do not have accounts at the financial
institutions; 97
5. Requiring financial institutions to develop profiles for suspi-
cious international wire transfers and report suspicious payments
to the Treasury Department;99
6. Requiring reports and recordkeeping of wire transfers only
to or from specifically targeted foreign financial institutions;299 and
7. Requiring information relative only to international book
transfers of credit not involving wire transfers.300
Each of these alternatives has both advantages and disadvan-
tages. At a minimum, financial institutions should be compelled to
record all identifying data on international wire transfer messages
over $10,000 and to wire copies of the transfers and identifying
data to the Treasury Department simultaneously with the wire
transfer. This would impose a minimal institutional burden and
make data available to the Treasury Department for electronic rec-
ordation without increasing its data input activities.
On October 15, 1990, the Treasury Department, after consid-
ering public comment, published a Notice of Proposed Rulernak-
ing.830 The proposed regulation would require financial institutions
to record the identities of the originators of wire transfers and
their recipients.302 A better proposal would require banks to elec-
tronically transmit to the Treasury Department all the data identi-
fying the parties involved in wire transfers over $10,000, whether







301. 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990).
302. Id. The final rule was not yet issued by the time this article went to print.
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enforcement officers to trace funds without the problem of corrupt
or careless banking employees alerting the money launderers.
3 0 3
Presently, account information is usually obtained by sub-
poena.3 0 4 The subpoenaed information, generally received after ten
days or more, often reveals wire transfers to or from other accounts
in other banks. Agents are then required to subpoena the records
of the newly revealed accounts. Once again, the records reveal wire
transfers to and from additional accounts in different banks.
305
This pattern continues indefinitely. All too often, by the end of the
audit trail, the investigators are left with records of accounts in the
names of fictitious individuals or front companies, and nothing
more.3 6 The immediate availability of the account information
would enable agents to trace the transactions by computer, obtain
seizure and arrest warrants, and take effective action without alert-
ing money launderers30°7
D. Smugglinlg of Currency
Since Customs does not have sufficient resources to inspect
persons, cargo, and conveyances entering the country, there is no
reason to believe that it has sufficient resources to conduct ade-
quate outbound inspections in order to discover currency being
smuggled out of the country. To help alleviate this problem, the
Government should make greater use of confidential informants.
As previously mentioned,30 8 Customs success in its outbound cur-
rency inspection program, Operation BUCKSTOP, was largely de-
pendent on the use of confidential informants. Informants are es-
pecially useful because Customs has the authority to conduct
searches without revealing the identity or even the very existence
of informants. 09 Additionally, Customs is able to purchase infor-
mation at a net profit to the Government because payments to in-
formants can be funded from the proceeds of seizures.310
Another recommendation is for the Government to make
greater use of undercover operations. During Operation POLAR
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CAP, the money launderers elicited the services of three different
undercover operations conducted by three different agencies, indi-
cating the potential success of such operations.3"t
Finally, the discontinuance of large denomination bills would
increase the bulk of the currency being smuggled, thus making de-
tection simpler. As noted earlier,8 12 the Government is exploring
the feasibility of discontinuing $50 and $100 bills.313
E. Foreign Cooperation
Once the laundered income is removed from the United
States, it is beyond U.S. jurisdiction and generally cannot be recov-
ered." 4 This presents a major problem in undercover operations
since the undercover agents must launder monies for the syndi-
cates in order to maintain their cover.3" Greater international co-
operation might alleviate this problem. The Treasury Department,
at Congress' urging, 3 6 has begun negotiations with some foreign
governments in this area.3" In addition, in January 1989, the Com-
mittee on Banking Regulations, composed of the Group of Ten in-
dustrialized nations, adopted a statement of principles aimed at
preventing international money laundering. 1 8 Furthermore, in
July 1989, at an economic summit, leaders of the seven major in-
dustrialized nations"I agreed to establish a money laundering task
force.32 0 Finally, some governments, including Australia,32' Ca-
311. See supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
313. The report was to be submitted to Congress within 180 days of the enactment of
the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6187,
102 Stat. 4358-59. However, according to David McCain, staff, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, it has not been received as of this writing.
314. Roberts Interview, supra note 30.
315. Id.
316. Int'l Currency Transaction Reporting Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4701, 102
Stat. 4290 (1988).
317. Martoche Testimony, supra note 270, at 4-6.
318. Daily Report for Executives (BNA) (Jan. 25, 1989). The ten nations are Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
319. The Group of Seven includes Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and West Germany. Paris Group Urges Decisive Action for Environ-
ment, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
320. Key Sections of the Paris Communique by the Group of 7, N.Y. Times, July 17,
1989, at A7, col. 5.
321. Nations Begin to Legislate Money Laundering Controls, MoNEY LAUNEIUNG
ALERT, Oct. 1989, at 7.
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nada, 32 2 England,8 23 and Switzerland8 2' are initiating independent
efforts to counter money laundering.
The ultimate goal, of course, is not only to recover monies al-
ready out of the country, but also to extradite the money launder-
ers and narcotics traffickers operating in foreign countries. In most
undercover money laundering operations involving Colombian Car-
tel proceeds, undercover agents get daily money laundering in-
structions either directly, from Colombia through a complicated
system of using telephone pagers, or indirectly through the money
laundering syndicate involved.2 The government's effort is fur-
ther complicated because cartel heads seldom leave Colombia and
virtually never enter U.S. jurisdiction.3 26
One disadvantage of relying on the cooperation of foreign gov-
ernments is that the drug traffickers and money launderers will
move their operations to other countries. However, if fewer alter-
natives are available to them, their activities will become more
centralized and obvious. Additionally, world opinion could pres-
sure remaining nations to amend their secrecy and extradition
laws. This pressure would grow as more nations cooperated, result-
ing in the "domino effect." When few havens remain, cooperating
nations could prohibit financial transactions with recalcitrant
countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Successful investigations like Operations C-CHASE and PO-
LAR CAP serve as examples of the effectiveness of the Govern-
ment's effort to fight drug trafficking by combatting money laun-
dering. Not only do these efforts cause serious problems for
narcotics traffickers, but they also help prevent traffickers from
penetrating legitimate businesses. The money laundering enforce-
ment program has been very successful to date. However, it is still
in need of the many improvements which have been recognized
and are being implemented, or, at least, carefully considered.
While the program has placed a considerable burden on financial
322. Id.
323. Evans, British Banks Get Warning on Laundering, Am. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1989, at
6, col. 1.
324. Parry, Swiss Plan Law to Curb Laundering, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1987, at 2, col. 1.




institutions and the business community, these institutions and
businesses appear to recognize that if the war against drugs is to be
won, it will require the concerted effort of all.
PATRICK T. O'BRIEN*
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